Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Table of contents -- List of figures -- List of tables -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1. Individual and collective political representation -- 1.2. Case selection -- 1.3. Empirical strategy -- 1.4. Outline of the book -- 2. Group leaders between individual and collective representation -- 2.1. The many advantages of local government -- 2.1.1. Local autonomy -- 2.1.2. Efficiency -- 2.1.3. Local democracy and participation -- 2.2. Party politicization of local government -- 2.2.1. Societal and state integration -- 2.2.2. Party competition -- 2.2.3. Incentives of local politicians -- 2.3. Responsible party government model and local government -- 2.3.1. The electoral arena -- 2.3.2. The legislative arena -- 2.4. Representational roles -- 2.4.1. Representational roles as 'patterned game plans' -- 2.4.2. Independent effect of representational roles? -- 2.5. The theoretical model -- 3. Conceptual tools -- 3.1. The concept of individual representation under party politicization -- 3.1.1. Contact -- 3.1.2. Policy -- 3.1.3. Control -- 3.2. Representative behavior -- 3.2.1. External activities -- 3.2.2. Internal activities -- 3.3. Instruments of leadership control -- 3.3.1. (Non)partisanship -- 3.3.2. Candidate selection process -- 3.3.3. Political ambition -- 4. Case selection -- 4.1. Shared history of local government during Yugoslavia -- 4.1.1. Yugoslav local government during the Second World War (1941 - 1945) -- 4.1.2. The period of state socialism (1945 - 1952) -- 4.1.3. The introduction of communes (1952 - 1963) -- 4.1.4. Further fiscal and administrative decentralization (1963 - 1974) -- 4.1.5. Participatory reform (1974 - 1991) -- 4.1.6. The legacy of Yugoslav local self-government system -- 4.2. Territorial structure and competences of local governments -- 4.2.1. Croatia -- 4.2.2. Slovenia.

Party-councillor ideological congruence reinforces party linkages with local voters and credibility of councillors as future party elites. This contribution examines the role of career motivations and selective incentives, as well as party branch characteristics in forming party-councillor congruence. The empirical analysis draws on the original survey of Croatian local councillors. The results find councillors with progressive ambition and those exposed to intra-branch competition reporting higher levels of ideological congruence with their parties, while no effect was found for holders of upper level party positions. Branch power has the opposite effect from expected. Party grassroots shape ideologically congruent professional politicians, but this function is challenged by shrinking supply of candidates.

Individual and Collective Political Representation -- The Advantages and Party Politicization of Local Government -- The Concept of Individual Representation under Party Politicization -- Comparative Development of Croatian and Slovenian Local Government -- Contacts, Council Activity and Reselection of Croatian and Slovenian Local Councilors

AbstractThis article calls for greater attention to immigration attitudes of members of national parliaments (MPs) who absent harmonized immigration policy at the EU level remain the chief decision-makers and are thus responsible for swift government reaction to large influx of immigrants as witnessed in summer 2015 and spring 2020. Against this background, attitudes of MPs toward non-EU immigrants can be highly informative for understanding the foundation and direction of future immigration policy reforms. Although knowledge of MPs immigration attitudes is seemingly important, studies interested in this topic remain scarce. To test the relative importance of identity and economic aspects of MPs' immigration attitudes, this study adopts few well-established theoretical approaches from citizen-level research. Our data come from an MP survey that was administered in 11 Western and Eastern European countries in late 2014 as part of theEuropean National Elites and the Crisisproject. Our results suggest that social identity (religiosity) along with political ideology rather than economic concerns drive MPs' immigration attitudes. In addition, we find that in Eastern Europe immigration is only a light force behind political competition unlike in Western Europe, while economic left in Eastern Europe is more anti-immigrant than in Western Europe.

This article calls for greater attention to immigration attitudes of members of national parliaments (MPs) who absent harmonized immigration policy at the EU level remain the chief decision-makers and are thus responsible for swift government reaction to large influx of immigrants as witnessed in summer 2015 and spring 2020. Against this background, attitudes of MPs toward non-EU immigrants can be highly informative for understanding the foundation and direction of future immigration policy reforms. Although knowledge of MPs immigration attitudes is seemingly important, studies interested in this topic remain scarce. To test the relative importance of identity and economic aspects of MPs' immigration attitudes, this study adopts few well-established theoretical approaches from citizen-level research. Our data come from an MP survey that was administered in 11 Western and Eastern European countries in late 2014 as part of the European National Elites and the Crisis project. Our results suggest that social identity (religiosity) along with political ideology rather than economic concerns drive MPs' immigration attitudes. In addition, we find that in Eastern Europe immigration is only a light force behind political competition unlike in Western Europe, while economic left in Eastern Europe is more anti-immigrant than in Western Europe. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1057/s41295-021-00254-5.

In this article, we offer the first systematic study of the attitudes of Croatian MPs about various aspects of Europeanness. Following the overwhelming elite consensus in 2012, when Croatia was about to join, MPs are still relatively satisfied with the EU in 2014. We argue beneficiary member mindset prevails among Croatian MPs suppressing any greater degree of Euroscepticism. However, 'soft Euroscepticism' is present, especially among right wing HDZ. Our analysis rests on 70 interviews with MPs and is a part of ENEC (2014) project. Croatian MPs take visible consideration of symbolic and strategic aspects when thinking about the EU. They have solid confidence in the EU institutions, report satisfaction with EU returns, favor further policy Europeanization and strongly identify as European elite. Negative feedback about the EU relates to poor representation of Croatia's interests. Our analysis reveals that by ceding some sovereignty MPs hope to compensate for redistribution of benefits by further policy Europeanization and better channels of interest representation. EU budget receivers seem to be better off in the EU rather than outside.

In this article, we offer the first systematic study of the attitudes of Croatian MPs about various aspects of Europeanness. Following the overwhelming elite consensus in 2012, when Croatia was about to join, MPs are still relatively satisfied with the EU in 2014. We argue beneficiary member mindset prevails among Croatian MPs suppressing any greater degree of Euroscepticism. However, 'soft Euroscepticism' is present, especially among right wing HDZ. Our analysis rests on 70 interviews with MPs and is a part of ENEC (2014) project. Croatian MPs take visible consideration of symbolic and strategic aspects when thinking about the EU. They have solid confidence in the EU institutions, report satisfaction with EU returns, favor further policy Europeanization and strongly identify as European elite. Negative feedback about the EU relates to poor representation of Croatia's interests. Our analysis reveals that by ceding some sovereignty MPs hope to compensate for redistribution of benefits by further policy Europeanization and better channels of interest representation. EU budget receivers seem to be better off in the EU rather than outside.

Prime ministers (PMs) significantly contribute to making parliamentary democracy work, but cabinet reshuffles can undermine the PM's ability to perform successfully. New ministers may have less policy expertise, intensify intra-cabinet struggles and hamper the control of government bureaucracy. This article explores the relationship between cabinet reshuffles and prime-ministerial performance in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Building on a data set covering 131 cabinets in 11 CEE countries between 1990 and 2018, we find that frequent cabinet reshuffles decrease prime-ministerial performance. In particular, the reshuffling of ministers belonging to other coalition parties than the PM's unfolds a strong negative effect on prime-ministerial performance, while reshuffles in core portfolios and turnover of ministers from the PM party have less negative consequences. These results have important implications for understanding executive politics and government stability in the dynamic environments of CEE democracies and beyond.

Even though Prime Ministers (PMs) are the central actors in parliamentary democracies, little comparative research explores what makes them perform successfully in office. This article investigates how the political careers of PMs affect their performance. For this purpose, we make use of a unique expert survey covering 131 cabinets in 11 Central and Eastern European countries between 1990 and 2018. Performance is defined as a two-dimensional set of tasks PMs ought to fulfill: first, managing the cabinet and directing domestic affairs as tasks delegated to their office, second, ensuring support of parliament and their own party, who constitute the direct principals. The findings indicate that a simple political insider career is not sufficient to enhance prime-ministerial performance. Rather, PMs who served as party leaders have the best preconditions to succeed in office.